{"id":42122,"date":"2025-09-23T16:29:16","date_gmt":"2025-09-23T08:29:16","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/flcube.com\/?p=42122"},"modified":"2025-09-23T16:29:17","modified_gmt":"2025-09-23T08:29:17","slug":"china-drug-procurement-centralized-rules-shape-11th-round-of-vbp","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/flcube.com\/?p=42122","title":{"rendered":"China Drug Procurement: Centralized Rules Shape 11th Round Of VBP"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

The Joint Procurement Office of the National Healthcare Security Administration (NHSA) published the definitive rules for the 11th round of China\u2019s centralized drug procurement program (VBP 11th). 55 drugs, with a total value exceeding RMB\u202f11\u202fbillion<\/strong>, will be tendered under a new set of \u201cwinning rules\u201d that tighten price limits and clarify volume allocation. Eligible manufacturers must submit their corporate and drug dossiers by 24:00 on September\u202f28<\/strong> and, if required, revise them by 16:00 on September\u202f29<\/strong>. The bidding window opens on October\u202f21,\u202f2025<\/strong> at the Pullman Shanghai Qingpu Excellence Hotel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

1. Rule Overview<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Rule<\/th>Core Requirement<\/th><\/tr><\/thead>
Rule\u202f1<\/strong><\/td>\u2022 Option\u202fA<\/em> \u2013 Unit comparable price \u2264\u202f1.8\u202f\u00d7\u202fanchor price.
\u2022 Option\u202fB<\/em> \u2013 Absolute caps: oral solids \u2264\u202f\u00a50.1, small\u2011volume injections \u2264\u202f\u00a51, large\u2011volume injections \u2264\u202f\u00a52.<\/td><\/tr>
Rule\u202f2<\/strong><\/td>\u2022 Bidders who lose under Rule\u202f1 may win if they accept the highest winning price from Rule\u202f1 or the 1.8\u00d7 anchor price (if only one Rule\u202f1 winner).
\u2022 For products with 1\u20132 bidders and no Rule\u202f1 winner, a price cut \u2265\u202f50\u202f% of the average reduction of other winners qualifies.<\/td><\/tr>
Rule\u202f3<\/strong><\/td>\u2022 Brand demand \u2265\u202faverage demand of all brands for that product.
\u2022 Company must not be the highest\u2011priced bidder for any other product.
\u2022 Acceptable price \u2264\u202f( highest winning price from Rules\u202f1\/2, average of that price & anchor, or anchor price).<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

2. Winning Volume Allocation<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Winning Rule<\/th>First\u2011Year Demand % (Fixed)<\/th>Tier\u2011Based Distribution<\/th><\/tr><\/thead>
Rule\u202f1 &\u202f2<\/strong><\/td>50\u202f% (1 winner) \u2192 50\u202f%
60\u202f% (2 winners) \u2192 60\u202f\u00d7\u202f{30\u202f%\/50\u202f%\/80\u202f%}
70\u202f% (3 winners) \u2192 70\u202f\u00d7\u202f{30\u202f%\/50\u202f%\/80\u202f%}
80\u202f% (4+ winners) \u2192 80\u202f\u00d7\u202f{30\u202f%\/50\u202f%\/80\u202f%}<\/td>		<\/td><\/tr>
Rule\u202f3<\/strong><\/td>Max\u202f% (up to 80\u202f%)<\/td>Tier\u202f1\u202f=\u202f\u2265\u202fhighest winning\/anchor
Tier\u202f2\u202f=\u202faverage of highest winning & anchor
Tier\u202f3\u202f=\u202f\u2264\u202fhighest winning\/anchor<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Note:<\/em> If Tier\u202f1,\u202f2,\u202f3 prices are identical, a uniform discount of 80\u202f% (Rule\u202f1\/2) or 20\u202f% (Rule\u202f3) applies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

3. Supply\u2011Region Composition<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Region<\/th>Unbranded (Fixed)<\/th>Brands with unmet demand (Fixed)<\/th>Rule\u202f3 Allocation (Max)<\/th><\/tr><\/thead>
1 winner<\/td>50\u202f%<\/td>50\u202f%<\/td>N\/A<\/td><\/tr>
2 winners<\/td>60\u202f%<\/td>60\u202f%<\/td>60\u202f\u00d7\u202f{70\u202f%\/50\u202f%\/20\u202f%}<\/td><\/tr>
3 winners<\/td>70\u202f%<\/td>70\u202f%<\/td>70\u202f\u00d7\u202f{70\u202f%\/50\u202f%\/20\u202f%}<\/td><\/tr>
4+ winners<\/td>80\u202f%<\/td>80\u202f%<\/td>80\u202f\u00d7\u202f{70\u202f%\/50\u202f%\/20\u202f%}<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

4. Market Implications<\/h3>\n\n\n\n